Should we represent the present in Minkowski spacetime? by Dorato, Mauro
Draft for the Proceedings of the 2009 European Science Foundation 
Conference, Zeist, The Netherlands 
 
Should we represent the present in Minkowski spacetime?1  
 
Mauro Dorato 
Department of Philosophy 





In recent times, there have been notable attempts to introduce an 
objective present in Minkowski spacetime, a structure that, 
however, should also be capable to explain some aspects of our 
experience of time. I claim that the “interactive present” introduced 
by Arthur and Savitt for such purposes is inadequate, since it turns 
out to be neither a physically relevant property nor a good 
explanans of our temporal experience. In its conclusive part, and 
after having proposed a more adequate model for the time of our 
experience, I draw some general morals about the relationship 
between physical time and experiential time. 
 







In recent times there have been interesting attempts to introduce 
a mind-independent present in Minkowski spacetime, a structure 
that has also be regarded as capable of explaining some aspects of 
our subjective experience of time, in particular the fact that we 
share a “now” but not a “here”.2 Considering that Minkowski 
spacetime is the arena for three out of the four interactions 
postulated by contemporary physics (electromagnetic, weak and 
strong), this claim, if correct, would be quite remarkable. Against 
the prevailing opinion of physicists and philosophers like Einstein, 
Russell, Grünbaum, Davies, Rovelli and many others, we would 
have in fact discovered that it is possible to find a now (even a 
“transient one”) in any contemporary physical theory whose 
spatiotemporal arena has the structure of Minkowski spacetime. At 
the same time, we would have gone some way toward a 
rapprochement of “the manifest image”3 of time − allegedly 
characterized by a spatially extended, transient now − with the 
physical image, traditionally dominated by the picture of a block 
universe in which the present is absent because regarded as purely 
mind-dependent. 
The main thesis of this paper is that in Minkowski spacetime the 
so-called “Alexandroff” or interactive present”, introduced by 
Arthur and Savitt4 for the above reasons, is neither a physically 
relevant property nor a good explanans of our temporal experience. 
Therefore, it should be dropped. On the one hand, being defined as 
the set of events that can be in mutual causal communication with a 
given segment of a worldline, the Alexandroff’s present is 
definitely objective and mind-independent, but not so relevant from 
the viewpoint of physics.5
 On the other hand, regarded from the subjective, first-person 
perspective, or even as the set of events typically picked out by the 
indexical “being present, the “Alexandroff’s present” turns out to 
be unfaithful to our experience, because it does not include all the 
events that experientially we regard as present, while including 
events that we do not regard as present. While Arthur explicitly 
denies that the interactive present can serve the purpose of 
describing the subjective present, both he and Savitt countenance 
the possibility of using it to explain or accommodate some key 
features of the subjective present. I will instead argue that, by 
incorrectly describing what we regard as present, the Alexandroff 
present is not a good explainer, since it is inferior to other available 
alternatives. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I will 
present Savitt’s two main motivations for having a present in 
Minkowski spacetime, and the corresponding two senses in which 
physics might be said to be in need of an objective now. In the 
second section, I will introduce the main features of the so-called 
“Alexandroff’s present” (henceforth “Alex”, for short), and the 
alleged link between the agreed-upon temporally extended 
character of the present of our experience (specious present) and its 
supposed “interactive nature”. In the third section I will discuss 
what I refer to as “Alex’s dilemma” between its marginal role in 
physics and its unfaithfulness to our experience. In the fourth 
section I will illustrate the former horn of the dilemma, by 
presenting some possible uses of Alex in mathematical physics: I 
will conclude that they are not sufficient to argue that Alex has an 
important role in physical theories. In the fifth, I will illustrate the 
latter horn of the dilemma, by defending an alternative, better 
explanation of the spatial extendedness of our experienced nows, 
based on empirical data concerning our psychophysical threshold 
for regarding two light signals as temporally successive.  
  
 
§1 Savitt’s two motivations for having a present in Minkowski 
spacetime 
 
The first, and possibly more important, motivation consists in 
showing that the task necessary to close “Shimony’s circle” 
between the objective aspect of time and its felt, subjective aspect, 
can, at least in principle, be completed:  
The program [of closing the circle] envisages the 
identification of the knowing subject (or, more 
generally, the experiencing subject) with a natural 
system that interacts with other natural systems. In 
other words, the program regards the first person and an 
appropriate third person as the same entity.6  
 
I am very sympathetic toward this project,7 as it is one of the 
inspiring Muses of the philosophy of time, and possibly of the 
philosophy of science in general. For this reason, I think that 
Savitt’s quite ambitious slogan “Philosophy of time should aim at 
an integrated picture of the experiencing subject with its felt time in 
an experienced universe with its spatiotemporal structure”8 should 
be endorsed.  
However, Savitt’s second motivation for introducing an 
objective now in Minkowski spacetime is, I take it, in potential 
conflict with his ambition of “closing Shimony’s circle”. Such a 
second motivation consists in his attempt to show that Einstein’s 
often quoted “worry” that physics cannot grasp “the Now” is in 
some sense unfounded.9 In his autobiography, Carnap tells us 
about Einstein’s views about the Now in its relation to science: 
«Once Einstein said that the problem of the now 
worried him seriously. He explained that the 
experience of the Now means something special for 
man…That this experience cannot be grasped by 
science seemed to him a matter of painful but 
inevitable resignation» (Carnap 1963, 37, my 
emphasis). 
 
Parallel to Savitt’s two motivations, there are two senses in 
which one could think that physics needs an objective now. 
According to the first sense, current physics is to be regarded as 
incomplete because it has not yet captured an allegedly objective 
property being now, a property that − unlike “being massive” or 
“being charged” − has so far escaped all physical theories. While 
such a first sense might be regarded as too strong, I take it that it is 
the only sense in which one would be entitled to conclude that 
“there is a viable alternative” to Einstein’s worry (see note 9).  
The second sense in which physics might need a now is quite 
weaker, as it amounts to claiming that a physically objective now 
− possibly corresponding to some objective spatiotemporal 
structure − is needed either to explain some key features of our 
subjective experience or manifest image, or in the practical 
application of physical theories by human beings, or to give a 
semantic interpretation of our use of “now” as an indexical.  
Incidentally, these two senses relative to a possible role of “the 
Now” in physics remind one of the current debates on the role of 
causation in physical theories. While Frisch10 defends a more 
substantive role for causation in physics (analogously to the first, 
stronger sense in which physics might need a now), Norton grants 
the pragmatic importance of causation, but argues that it is 
definitely absent from fundamental physical theories11 (in tune 
with the above illustrated weaker sense in which physics might 
need a now).  
I will now argue that it is only this second, weaker sense that 
one could have in mind when one claims that “physics needs a 
now”. While Arthur and Savitt explicitly agree with the point that 
the now could not figure in future, yet to be discovered, physical 
laws,12 they do not grasp its consequence vis à vis their ambitious 
project of introducing a now (in some sense) in physics. If any 
important physical property is sooner or later captured by laws, if 
“now” is an indexical, and indexicals cannot appear in laws, then I 
think one must conclude that Einstein’s and others’ claim is 
correct: there cannot be any Now in physical theories, since 
pragmatic uses or explanatory purposes do not suffice to 
overthrow Einstein’s worry. Einstein and all the other 
scientists/philosophers quoted above would not deny that in the 
application of physics we may have to resort to a now, so that 
Arthur’s and Savitt’s polemical point is overstated. I submit that 
there is no real disagreement between them and the 
philosophers/physicists whom they criticize.  
In order to be clearer about the import of my remark, let me put 
it this way. As hinted above, there is a strong and deep analogy 
between the issue of ascertaining the status of the now and that of 
clarifying the status of causation in physics. Well, on the basis of 
this analogy, I think it is fair to say that vis à vis the status of the 
now, Arthur and Savitt really side with Norton against Frisch, so 
that for them the sense in which physics needs a now cannot but be 
quite weak, but they seem to write as if they were on Frisch’s side, 
that is, as if there were significant sense in which physics needs a 
now. 
Going beyond Arthur’s and Savitt’s real intentions, one could 
try to defend the possibility of a strong sense in which physics 
may need a now by claiming that some property might not figure 
in laws, and yet be objective and physically relevant. However, the 
objectivity or mind-independence of a property or a relation is 
only a necessary but not also a sufficient condition for the property 
in question to be of physical interest. And with some qualifications 
to be discussed in section 4, Alex, regarded as the set of events 
that are in mutual causal communication with a segment of 
timelike curve, seems to be one of these objective but physically 
irrelevant properties.  
It seems then safe to conclude that the only reason to introduce 
an objective present in Minkowski spacetime ought to be linked to 
the above mentioned second sense, the sense that I think Arthur 
and Savitt are really after. Let me stress one more time, however, 
that this sense leaves Einstein’s claim unscathed, at least as long as 
we are not prepared to regard physics as incomplete simply 
because it has not yielded so far a solution to the body-mind 
problem, by giving a third person, physical description of our 
temporal experience.  
In the rest of the paper I will argue that even in the second, 
weaker sense, Alex is an arbitrary choice, since other 
spatiotemporally extended structures, or other non-geometrical 
explanations, can do the job in a more satisfactory way.  
 
§2 Alex’s features in relation to the extended character of our 
experience 
 
It is now time to look at the features of “Alex” in some more 
detail, since they are crucial in order to assess its suitability for 
explaining our experience of time, or for accounting for some 
pragmatic uses of the “present” in cosmology, as when we claim 
that, for example, “galaxies in our universe formed a certain 
number of billions year ago”, or “the present age of expansion of 
the universe”.13  
The Alexandroff’s present relative to a segment of any 
timelike curve delimited by points a and b is the intersection 
of the future light-cone whose vertex is the beginning event a 
with the past light cone whose vertex is the end event b (it is 
assumed, as customary, a temporal orientation). The 
Alexandroff’s present relative to the segment a-b of a 
worldline − call such a set Alex [a,b] − is then by definition 
the set of points in the above mentioned intersection. The 
(relational) objectivity of Alex [a,b] depends on the 
invariance of the relation of causal connectibility within the 
special theory of relativity. In fact, it turns out that any event 
in the set Alex [a,b] is both a possible effect and a possible 
cause of events on the segment of the worldline, and for this 
reason it could be regarded as the set of events with which 
my body or any other physical system modelled by a 
worldline can in principle interact during the time-like 
interval a,b. Notice for example that in fig. 1 below, point c, 
which is outside Alex [a,b] but inside event’s b past light 
cone, can be a possible cause of many events on the segment, 
but is not in mutual causal contact with all of it, since it 
cannot, in its turn, be caused by events belonging to the 
segment.14 The notion of mutual causal connection can be 
put more precisely in this way: Alex’s present relative to a,b 
is the set of all points z such that there exist two points x and 
y, belonging to the segment a, b for which we have both CPxz 
and CPzy, where CP is the relation of past causal 
connectibility.15
One more point worth noting is that the length of the timelike 
interval under consideration may vary from context to context, and 
this is certainly an advantage of this conception: as we know from 
ordinary discourse, “now” can pick out my present perception, the 
present historical moment, or even the “present stage” of cosmic 
expansion.  








                               FIG. 1 
Imagine that the segment a,b represents, with due 
idealizations, my pointlike body looking at this room “right 
now”. If you are unhappy with a segment, imagine a long 
and thin cylinder, a worldtube. Why should my experience 
be represented as temporally extended along the segment a-
b, so as to form what is known as a specious present? There 
are two possible arguments in favour of such a hypothesis. 
One comes from phenomenological evidence stemming 
already from James, Husserl and other psychologists and 
phenomenologists, linked to studies related, say, to our 
perception of music or language. The wealth of evidence 
coming from this corner and militating against a point-like 
present is quite strong.  
A second, more speculative and physicalist argument, has 
been put forth by Stein. On Stein’s hypothesis, the temporal 
extendedness of the present of our experience is due to the 
conditions that he regards as necessary for a conscious 
experience to occur. These conditions require coordination, 
i.e., several mutual interactions of the parts of the brains 
with themselves and of such parts with their external 
environment. Notoriously, in relativistic physics, interactions 
take time, and it is this empirical hypothesis that could 
explain, among other things, why our experience of the 
present is not knife-edged, as James put it, but “specious”, or 
temporally extended.  
In a word, the idea of a spatiotemporally extended present 
like Alex’s  − a set of events that is in mutual possible causal 
interaction with our bodies and brains experiencing 
something − in Stein’s opinion would be a consequence of 
the fact that the stability of the various parts of our brains 
and of the external physical objects around us needs several 
coordinations, which are realized by mutual physical 
influence.16
Agreed: one immediate advantage of choosing Alex as a model 
of our experienced present is that it allows a plausible explanation 
of the reason why we all share the same now,17 as well as of our 
“natural” intuition − belonging to “the manifest image of time  − 
that the now, or the present moment, appears to us as being 
cosmically extended: Alex is temporally thin and spatially fat.18 
This “illusion”, notoriously, was unmasked by Einstein in order to 
lay the foundations of the special theory of relativity. To this 
purpose, he had to show that any perception ascertaining the 
simultaneity of two events is always strictly local, so that the 
attribution of a relation of simultaneity to two distant events 
necessarily entails some conventional, or operational element.  
Considering the fact that our experience of time is always local, 
it is also natural to claim that if we want to represent our experience 
of time in Minkowski spacetime, we must rely (on segments of 
worldlines measured by) proper time, and not on coordinate time. 
Dieks has pointed out, correctly in my opinion, that we don’t need 
global nows to accommodate our local experience, since different 
spatial hyperplanes intersecting the same point or the same short 
timelike segment (an idealized representation of our body) lead to 
the same experience.19
However, notice that Alex’s spatial extendedness, while 
sufficient to explain the corresponding aspect of our experienced 
now, is by far not sufficient to consider Alex as a good explanans. 
Different extended regions of spacetime might also succeed in 
explaining this aspect of our experience, and Savitt must somehow 
show that Alex is the best explanation we can give, a difficult task 
that he tries to undertake without success, I think, and that I will 
discuss in the last section. 
Summarizing my presentation of Arthur and Savitt’s view of 
Alex, I agree with them on the following two points: (1) the present 
of our experience looks extended; (2) the notion of time on which 
to base the representation of the experienced present in Minkowski 
spacetime is proper time rather than coordinate time.   
 
 
§3 Alex caught between its uselessness in physics and its 
unfaithfulness to our experience 
 
 
The dilemma that I want to present in this section is a 
consequence of a tension between Savitt’s two motivations for 
introducing Alex in Minkowski spacetime, which for brevity I will 
refer to as “Shimony’s circle” and “Einstein’s worry”. In a word, I 
will now argue that  
(i) the undisputable objectivity of Alex − needed by Savitt and 
Arthur to subvert (at least partially) Einstein’s opinion against the 
describability of the now within physics − makes it unsuitable to 
account for the subjective present; 
 (ii) conversely, any success in representing the subjective 
present with a geometric structure of Minkowski spacetime would 
make a solution to Einstein’s worry highly implausible. Let me 
broach these two points in turn.  
(i)  
Alex, as recognized explicitly by Arthur (and, I think, implicitly 
recognized also by Savitt), is not the subjective present, or “the set 
of all those events of which we are consciously aware at the 
moment of considering them”.20  
One of the reasons for this claim is put forward by Arthur 
himself: the set of events that we can actually be conscious of 
during an interval of time is always a subset of the set of those 
events that are in actual mutual communication with our bodies 
during that interval. This is not simply due to our selective attention 
− filtering out from our awareness many events that are in our 
relative Alex − but also to the fact that Alex is the set of possible 
and not of actual causes and effects affecting our bodies during a 
specious present. Therefore, many events in Alex will not be 
registered by our consciousness, and Alex cannot coincide with the 
events represented in our subjective present.  
For analogous reasons, however, the set of events in Alex is not 
picked out by our everyday uses of “now”, when the latter is 
regarded (as it ought to, in Arthur’s, Savitt’s and my opinion) as an 
indexical. While the context dependence of such uses is well 
accounted for by the variable length of the timelike curve whose 
extremes are a,b, and while it must be admitted that our uses of the 
indexical “now” need not necessarily pick out the set of events that 
we subjectively regard as present, the intentions of the speakers are 
certainly relevant to fix the events picked out by the indexicals we 
use. However, by no stretch of imagination could we claim that by 
uttering “now” we typically intend to refer to all the events with 
which we are in possible and mutual causal communication 
(namely, to Alex). On Savitt’s and Arthur’s part, this could be 
stipulated only with a remarkable degree of arbitrariness, since in 
our usage of now, the idea of intending to refer to events 
simultaneous to our speech act seems much more prominent.  
However, if Alex is neither (nor is it intended to be) the 
subjective present, nor is the set of events that we typically intend 
to pick out when we use the temporal indexical “now”, why should 
we be believe that − simply in virtue of its spatial fatness − it is 
needed or relevant to explain our experience”? 
As an additional argument against the adoption of Alex as an 
explanans of our temporal experience, notice that when we look, 
say, at the starry sky, we believe that it is part of our present 
experience. However, the events corresponding to the emission of 
light from a supernova occurred various year before our perception, 
and are therefore certainly not in out momentary specious present, 
which typically lasts more than half a second but less than a few 
seconds. Notice that knowing that the emission of light from the 
supernova is before our perception does not make us change the 
way we perceive the events in question: our illusion of presentness 
of the supernova is as stubborn as Müller-Lyer’s famous illusion of 
the arrows appearing of different length despite our knowing that 
the segments of the two arrows are equally long.  
It then follows that the events on the supernova responsible for 
our perception of it are outside the Alex’s present representing our 
specious present, and yet they are pre-theoretically regarded by us 
as being present.  
It seems that we can conclude that if Alex does not describe our 
subjective present correctly, a fortiori it cannot explain it, at least if 
we accept the thesis that the explanation in question requires the 
existence of a supervenience relation between our subjective, 
mental events associated to our experience of the now and Alex, 
regarded as subvenient basis of physical events. The example of the 
supernova shows that, by taking for granted the intentionality and 
the externalistic character of our mental states, an experience of the 
present must include events that are not contained in Alex (the base 
of supervenience). So a difference in what we regard as present (we 
look at a star that is much farther away than the previous 
supernova), by including in any case events outside Alex, is not 
reflected in a change of the subvenient base; since this means that 
our subjective experience does not supervene on Alex, we must 
accept the view that the explanation of our temporal experience 
does not supervene on Alex. But then, how can Alex’s explanation 
of some aspects of our subjective present be regarded as reliable? 
It could be replied that whenever we are looking at closer stars, 
say, the Sun, we could stretch the segment [a,b] that represents our 
present into a much longer temporal intervals (16 minutes), so as to 
include the original electromagnetic emission from our star. Such 
an “elastic” procedure could possibly be iterated even when we 
look at the nocturnal sky with a powerful telescope. Wouldn’t this 
be a way to rescue Alex from the charge of being “unfaithful” to 
our experienced present because of lack of supervenience? After 
all, we have already noticed how the length of the present is 
pragmatically dependent on the events we are referring to.  
Suppose we accept this elasticity as a necessary consequence of 
the variability of the contexts of utterance of the temporal 
indexical. This “stretchy Alex” however, would be parasitic on a 
different model of the experienced present, a model that is 
altogether different from the original “Alex”, and that includes 
events lying on the past light cone. The amount of the stretch, or 
the length of the elastic, would in fact come to depend on the events 
we are looking at, and therefore on our regarding as present the 
set of events on the past light cone centered in our bodies. This 
would be tantamount to regard Alex’s as dependent on another type 
of “present”, one that would admittedly be much closer to our 
experience, but that would identify the present with the events on 
the past light cone. If the length of Alex becomes supervenient on 
the distance of the events which we are interacting with, one must 
accept that Alex is less accurate a representation of our present 
experience than the past light cone.  
Arthur, who considered the possibility of representing the 
present of our experience with the set of events lying on the past 
light cone, complains that such a move would be equivalent to 
eliminating «any distinction between past and present».21 This is 
doubtlessly correct. Arthur should have realized, however, that the 
elimination he complains about is the essential feature and by-
product of our experience of the present. In fact, we are completely 
unaware of the time lag due to the speed of light, and 
unconsciously attribute light an infinite speed: the approximation, 
for all practical purposes of our earthbound life, is extremely good 
since objects that are close “enough”, as noted by Butterfield, 
typically don’t change much after light bounces off them and 
reaches our retinas.22
I think that what we are facing here is a deep, acute conflict 
between the descriptive needs of physics and those of the 
psychology/phenomenology of the experience of time. On the one 
hand, if we adopt Einstein’s standard convention of simultaneity in 
terms of “inertial-worldline-orthogonality”, from the viewpoint of 
physics the events of the emission of the electromagnetic radiation 
from the stars or the Sun must be regarded as being in the causal 
past of our perceiving bodies. On the other hand, if we regard the 
emission of radiation from celestial objects and our act of 
perceiving it as simultaneous with our perceptions, we are much 
more faithful to our experience, but we eliminate any difference 
between past and present.  
We could of course adopt a criterion of simultaneity that is 
different from the one that is customarily adopted, and yet closer to 
our experience of time: according to this different method, we 
could regard as simultaneous with our perception any event on the 
past light cone. However, as already noted by Einstein, this method 
of fixing simultaneity would be quite impractical for physical 
needs, because it would make simultaneity depend on the particular 
spatiotemporal position occupied by the clock: 
We might, of course, content ourselves with time 
values determined by an observer stationed together 
with the watch at the origin of the co-ordinates, and co-
ordinating the corresponding positions of the hands 
with light signals, given out by every event to be timed, 
and reaching him through empty space. But this co-
ordination has the disadvantage that it is not 
independent of the standpoint of the observer with the 
watch or clock, as we know from experience.”23  
 
The impracticality of the method of simultaneity discussed in 
this quotation shows that even if we decided to modify Einstein 
standard criterion of simultaneity, the descriptive needs of physics 
and those of psychology would diverge. 
The second argument against the possibility of stretching 
indefinitely Alex according to needs is this: if the 
extension/duration of the now were totally context-dependent, i.e., 
dependent on what we observe, its physical meaning would seem to 
become proportionally weaker. Alex would still be objective, but 
characterized by a length that is somehow mind-or observer 
dependent!! So once again our attempt to solve Einstein’s worry 
fails to the benefit of trying to solve the issue raised by “Shimony’s 
circle”.  
These conclusions are generalizable to structures other than 
Alex and the past light cone above. Once we accept (for physical 
reasons) Einstein’s standard criterion of simultaneity, it follows 
that even if we could successfully model the psychological present 
by using some other structure, like the past light-cone discussed 
above, we would end up with something which introduces some 
deep discrepancies with the constraints of the physical description 
of the world. And the simplest hypothesis that explains this gap is 
this: our natural folk-physical belief about what is present is 
illusory, since it falsely assumes the presentness (simultaneity with 
our perception) of whatever falls into our visual fields, supernova 
explosions included.  
Einstein has expressed the illusory nature of our experience of 
time quite clearly: 
“The illusion which prevailed prior to the enunciation 
of the theory of relativity − that, from the point of view 
of experience the meaning of simultaneity in relation to 
spatially distant events and, consequently, that the 
meaning of physical time is a priori clear − this illusion 
had its origin in the fact that in our everyday 
experience we can neglect the time of propagation of 
light. We are accustomed on this account to fail to 
differentiate between "simultaneously seen" and 
"simultaneously happening"; and, as a result, the 
difference between time and local time is blurred.” 24  
 
To summarize what I tried to show in this section in a single 
sentence: there are events in Alex that are not in our experience of 
the present, and events that are in our experience of the present that 
are not in Alex. And while in Savitt’s and Arthur’s intentions Alex 
is doubtlessly no more than a first step in explaining our subjective 
temporal experience − so that they would agree that much more 
needs to be done − I claim that the above discussion suffices to 
show that it is a step in a wrong direction.  
I think that these considerations are sufficient to conclude this 
section with these two remarks:  
1) In virtue of its objectivity, Alex cannot fulfil the aim of 
closing Shimony’s circle. The question of bridging the gap between 
the time of physics and the time of the manifest image is still up for 
grabs, and must be studied by other means, namely 
neurophysiology and psychology,25 and not by combining some 
arbitrary physical structure physics with some features of our 
experience. 
2) Attempts to close Shimony circle by adding structures to 
Minkowski spacetime are destined to be unsuitable for the 
descriptive purpose of physics, and therefore to prove Einstein’s 
worry unfounded.  
Against Savitt, I think I can conclude that the two motivations 
above cannot be had at the same time, and one of them must give 
way. In the next two sections, we will see that, as a matter of fact, 
the situation is even worse: Alex can serve neither purpose. The 
physical irrelevance of the interactive present on one hand (§4), 
and further arguments in favour of the unfaithfulness of the 
interactive present on the other (§5), will complete my objections 
to the introduction of Alex in a physical theory whose 




 §4 The physical irrelevance of Alex 
 
It would be unfair to claim that the Alex’ present has no role 
whatsoever in physical theories. For instance, the condition of 
“strong causality” in a Riemannian manifold is provably equivalent 
to the fact that the Alexandroff topology coincides with the 
manifold topology, or to the fact that the Alexandroff topology is 
Hausdorff.26 The basis of this topology is given by the intersection 
of the set of future directed timelike curves originating from p with 
the set of past directed timelike curves originating from q, with p 
earlier than q: {I+(p) ∩ I−(q) : p, q ∈ M}. 
 Readers will recognize Alex’s present relative to the segment 
[p, q] of the timelike curve, except that the Alex also contains 
lightlike geodesics, and is therefore {J+(p) ∩ J−(q) : p, q ∈ M}, 
where J+ (p) is the set of future directed causal curves originating 
from p and J−(q) is the set of past directed causal curves originating 
from q.  
We need to distinguish an important fact separating Minkowski 
spacetime from general relativistic spacetimes, and investing the 
possibility of deriving metrical facts from topological/causal facts 
alone. While in Minkowski spacetime the manifold topology 
coincides with the Alexandroff topology, in order to obtain the 
desired equivalence in general relativity, we need to impose the 
further condition of strong causality, which is equivalent to the fact 
that the manifold has no “almost-closed causal curves”, or no 
curves that come arbitrarily close to intersecting themselves. This 
means that “for every point p in the manifold M and for every 
neighbourhood O of p, there is another neighbourhood V of p 
contained in O such that no causal curve intersects V more than 
once”.27  
In Minkowski spacetime it can be shown (following Robb) that 
the postulation of a “beforeness” relation, plus some axioms that 
such a relation satisfy, is sufficient to fix the fact that an event is in 
the interior of a past or of a future light cone.28 This means that all 
the topological properties of regions of Minkowski spacetime can 
be recovered just by looking at the relation of causal connectibility, 
and the topology of spacetime can be the Alexandroff topology.  
In a word, the main foundational interest of the Alexandroff 
topology lies in the possibility of determining metrical facts from 
topological facts involving the interiors of the light cones of 
Minkowski spacetime. The possibility of quasi-closed curves in 
general relativistic models, however, divorces the manifold 
topology from the Alexandroff topology, because in spacetime with 
almost closed causal curves not all causal automorphisms can also 
be homeomorphisms (i.e., topology preserving mappings).  
However, it should be admitted that the illustrated role of the 
Alexandroff topology in foundational studies is a far cry from 
claiming that Alex is relevant for physics. In particular, there is no 
connection between the Alexandroff topology and temporal 
properties, despite the fact that stably causal spacetimes − for 
which the above relationship between manifold topology and 
Alexandroff topology a fortiori holds − do have a cosmic time.29  
The latter concept is relevant for another issue: Arthur claims 
that it is in the application of physics, rather than with respect to 
physical laws, that the now has a role. He correctly points out that 
it makes a great deal of difference with respect to available 
evidence whether it is supposed that the Big Bang occurred 14 or 
26 billions years ago: “the relativity of the now to certain events 
(humans having theories) does not detract from its objectivity”.30 
However, here the question is not the objectivity but the relevance 
of the now for physics. In the sentence just quoted, we can give the 
truth conditions of the above tensed expression by simply pointing 
out that, relatively to a certain class of events in spacetime, where 
we are tenselessly located at the moment in which we use a certain 
theory, the Big Bang has occurred 14 billions years before those 
events, rather than 26 billions before. But let us even grant a role to 
the tensed expression “billions of years ago” (we can accept that 
indexicals have essential meanings), and let us suppose that the 
“located” above is “located now”. Why should this expression 
entail reference to the set of events that is in mutual causal 
interaction with the worldline that, initiating with the Big Bang, 
intersects now the areas of spacetime in which we now refer to that 
first event, is not clear at all!  
Given the possibility of using a cosmic time, as it is customary 
in Frieman-Robertson-Walker’s cosmological models (without 
thereby using cosmic time to refer to a cosmic present), we can 
interpret that tensed language (billions years ago) as referring, in 
the moment in which we use the theory, to the proper time of the 
“fundamental observer” associated with the mean motion of matter 
in our local cluster or supercluster of galaxies. Such a proper time 
can be extended, given certain assumptions, to the proper time of 
other “fundamental observers”. Once again, this standard 
manoeuvre is fully compatible with denying the possibility of using 
cosmic time to defend a cosmically extended present. However, the 
point here is that our need of referring to the beginning of time and 
space cannot be said to provide evidence for the postulation of 
Alex. In virtue of the Cosmological Principle in fact, “the age of 
the Universe” is in fact something that holds for all possible 
regions of the universe now sharing the same values of pressure 
and density of cosmological dust, and not just for us users of the 
physical theory in a particular region along a particular worldline, 
as seems to be implied by local structures like Alex’s. 
  
§5 Another model of the present of our experience? 
 
The point of this final section is to show that not only is Alex 
unsuitable to represent or explain some features of the present of 
our experience, but also that no other structure of Minkowski 
spacetime could do the job. This will allow me to conclude that we 
should not try to use such a spacetime to represent or explain or 
account for features of the present of our experience, in the weakest 
possible sense of explain or account. Given the facts (already 
argued for) that  
(i) Alex has no important applications in physical theories; 
(ii) it does not seem a plausible explanation of the 
extendedness of our subjective present,31 and  
(iii) these seem the two only reasons to introduce it,  
I conclude that we should drop it.  
With respect to (ii), we have already explained why Alex’s 
interactive present, if used to explain our subjective present, should 
at least describe it correctly. In this spirit, it seems reasonable to 
add to the previously discussed counterexample of heavenly bodies 
that Alex should also contain events that we regard as present 
simply because their temporal separation is so small as to be 
inferior to our capacity to tell them apart. There is a lot of 
experimental evidence in this field, which for our purpose we need 
to consider only synthetically, and which, however, is very relevant 
in order to explain the central feature of our experience of time.32  
The main fact that I want to draw attention to is that Alex’s 
present does not contain events that we nevertheless consider as 
simultaneous, in a sense of simultaneous that is close to Stein’s 
notion of “contemporaneous” (see note 16). Owing to the minimal 
threshold that is necessary to distinguish two light signals as being 
temporally successive, we perceive as simultaneous events that are 
separated by less than a given threshold.  
More in general, the threshold to tell two signals apart is 
different from person to person, and varies also from sensorial 
modality to sensorial modality. But in average, and for visual 
stimula, empirical research indicates that there is a threshold of 
30ms for a person to be able to tell two flashes of light apart, let 
alone determine their temporal order, for which at least 45 ms are 
necessary. Multiplying the threshold time 30ms by the speed of 
light c, we get 30 x 10-3 x 300.000 km/h = 9000 km. A flash a, that 
originated 30 ms ago on the surface of a sphere whose radius is 
9000 km, but simultaneous with event b, where I am located, 
registers on my retina only 30ms later, at event d.  







                                              FIG.2 
The flash a objectively precedes my reception of it at d, yet I 
perceive anything inside a sphere of a radius of 9000km, a 
included, as simultaneous with b and d.  
Since light signals intersecting the vertical segment b-d are 
physically temporally separated but cannot be perceived as being 
temporally separated, they should be treated as part of the set of 
points that are subjectively regarded as present. Notice that events 
like c, supposing that are on the light cone, are not in Alex [b,d] but 
are perceived as simultaneous with b (at the center of the sphere) 
and with a, at its surface, and therefore are in the same present of 
the observer located in b. This counts as an another objection to the 
view that Alex can accommodate the present of our experience: 
Alex cannot explain the present of our experience since it does not 
contain events that we are bound to regard as present.  
Should we then propose the grey area in the figure as a more 
faithful replacement of Alex and claim that the succession of the 
grey, conical regions along worldlines represents the passage of 
time?  
I would be ready to maintain that the grey wedge or conical 
model is much less arbitrary than Arthur and Savitt’s proposal, as it 
is based on well-confirmed psycho-physiological data, and that, 
therefore, it describes more precisely the extended character of our 
psychological present, in which perceived space, regarded as 
Leibniz’s order of coexistence, is a construction of our brains. And 
yet, I am not sure that we should continue the game that Arthur and 
Savitt initiated by playing it with a different ball. 
We have already noted how the fusion of the past with the 
present, of what is far away with what is occurring right here, 
explains why our experience of time  “misrepresents” the physical, 
objective temporal separation of events. The misrepresentation, or 
better, the temporal fusion of timelike-related or light-like related 
events, is due to the fact that the time of occurrence of events is 
merged with the time of our perceiving them. To acknowledge that 
the present is extended means to acknowledge that the “past-there” 
is fused with the “present-here” because they are treated as 
simultaneous in virtue of the threshold needed to tell events apart. 
From an evolutionary viewpoint, this fusion does not represent any 
terrible distortion of our environment, insofar as objects, as noted 
by Butterfield, do not change their properties too much during the 
time needed by light to inform us about them.  
Notice that if we acknowledge that our experience of time is a 
fusion of events that from the viewpoint of physics are temporally 
separated, then it does not make much sense to try to represent 
with a geometrical/physical structure the set of events that we 
represent as being present, except by specifying that these events 
are part of a single experience of simultaneity.  
Consequently, we do need to distinguish the “physical present” 
of events and the psychological present. The former, due to the 
relativity of simultaneity, and at least in Minkowski spacetime, 
must be represented as pointlike (each physical event is present, 
from its own “perspective”, when and where it occurs), and it is 
only the latter that is extended, and can include many pointlike 
physical events, many of which are temporally separated from the 
other: violations of achronality are admissible only for the 
psychological present, but not for the physical present. If we want 
to bridge the gap between the time of physics and the time of our 
experience, it is important to begin our work by recognizing their 
important differences.  
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